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Misused Statistics and Unfounded Claims 
 
At the outset, we would like to address several common — and highly misleading — 
critiques of DAFs. 
 
Madoff/Colinvaux and other DAF critics frequently cite two key statistics to make their 
case for additional DAF regulation. First, they argue that because overall charitable giving 
has remained at about 2 percent of GDP, while contributions to DAFs have been 
increasing steadily, this somehow provides prima facie evidence that DAF contributions 
are (as they say in their letter to the Finance Committee) “attracting dollars that would 
otherwise be contributed directly to active nonprofits.” Second, they posit that high 
average payout rates from DAFs somehow obscure high levels of inactivity. For example, 
Madoff has argued that a 16 percent average payout can be achieved if 20 percent of DAFs 
pay out 80 percent of their balance and 80 percent of DAFs make no grants, with no 
regard to whether this happens in the real world.  
 
The repeated use of these statistics is grossly misleading. Consider: 
 
• GDP is a very large number—$18.57 trillion in 2016. While total giving has averaged 1.9 
percent of GDP annually over the long term, total charitable giving reached $390 
billion in 2016 — or 2.1 percent of GDP.  In 2016, all nine major charitable giving 
categories experienced increases in giving for only the sixth time in 40 years.1 An 
increase from 1.9 to 2.1 percent of GDP may sound modest, but that represents a very 
significant change in dollars going to charity: about $37 billion, or a 10 percent increase 
in overall charitable giving. 
 
Our point isn’t that current levels of charitable giving are acceptable; we would all like 
to see more philanthropy, and leading charitable groups have been working with 
Congress on proposals to achieve that result. However, when considering huge 
numbers such as percentage of GDP, simply rounding to 2 percent and using that to 
buttress an argument makes little sense. Tenths of a percent make a big difference. 
 
• The implication of this argument about total charitable giving staying constant is that 
“normal” giving (i.e., gifts that get spent in the year they are made) is being “crowded 
out” by giving that gets invested rather than spent immediately. But this is not at all 
accurate; many other types of charities other than public and private foundations 
invest a portion of their charitable gifts for future needs. The extension of logic behind 
the argument would then be, it seems, that all the money charities raise every year 
should be spent in that year. Basic principles of organizational management would 
advise against that. Therefore, it makes little sense to us to single out the treatment of 
                                                     
1 Giving USA: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2016 (2017). Chicago: Giving USA Foundation™. 
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a popular philanthropic tool that is intended to achieve future stability while staying 
silent about similar strategies used by other “active” or “real” charities. 
 
• The GDP statistic also fails to account for how DAFs allow donors to increase their 
giving over time—giving not accounted for in the GDP statistic. To provide a simple 
example, if someone donates $100,000 to a DAF at their local community foundation, 
and then after 10 years the donor has made $100,000 in grants out of the fund and 
retains $100,000 in principal due to the investment gains, the “percent of GDP” statistic 
will only account for the initial $100,000 gift made in the first year, even though the 
initial gift has led to much more than $100,000 in total grantmaking. Every community 
foundation can provide numerous examples like this, yet DAF critics repeatedly fail to 
acknowledge it. 
 
In addition to the misleading use of GDP to characterize charitable giving, we feel it is 
important to distinguish the realities of DAFs as a charitable giving tool from the 
perception that drives a number of unfounded claims by DAF critics.  
 
In their letter, Madoff/Colinvaux argue that because current law does not require an 
annual payout, donors “may [our emphasis] indefinitely defer contributions from their 
DAF accounts.” Note the careful use of the word “may.” The key point is, they don’t know. 
They assume it’s happening just because it’s possible. In many of her articles on DAFs, 
Madoff frames her critique in this way because most DAF critics do not have hard 
evidence that donors are “parking” their assets and/or failing to make regular grants. 
 
We believe strongly that public policy should be based on what is happening. In our 
experience, donors use DAFs at community foundations to develop a philanthropic plan 
and become deeply engaged in the community. They are not using the DAF to somehow 
“hide” or “shelter” their assets, and there is no incentive for either the donor or the 
community foundation to not make grants. (Remember that the gift to a DAF is a 
completed charitable gift, where the gift no longer belongs to the donor.)  The 
Community Foundation Public Awareness Initiative conducted an informal survey of its 
participants in 2014 and 2016 and found that almost all of them had made grants in the 
prior 36 month period from more than 90 percent of DAF accounts. 
 
Madoff and Colinvaux write that some funds make no distributions at all, but they offer no 
evidence or statistics on how often this occurs at major DAF sponsors.2 In reality, there are 
a number of perfectly legitimate reasons why a donor may not make a grant in a particular 
year (e.g., growing a fund over several years to make a grant larger than the initial 
                                                     
2 Madoff/Colinvaux cite a statistic that 25 percent of DAF sponsors distribute less than one percent of their 
assets in a given year, but these aren’t community foundations, or even the commercial sponsors. According to 
a Congressional Research Service study from a few years ago, many of these “inactive” DAFs are housed at 
sponsors holding only a single DAF, and these accounts represent a very small fraction of DAF accounts or 
DAF assets. Congress would be better served to collect data on where these funds are, so they can change tax 
law to address this specific circumstance. 
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contribution down the road; the DAF is under advisement by a couple who are going 
through a divorce; a DAF is established as part of a bequest but cannot make grants until 
the estate is fully settled, etc.). We would argue that Congress would be better served to 
collect data on these questions (for example, gathering data on how many DAF accounts 
are regularly “inactive,” without an extenuating circumstance or a giving plan in place) 
before changing public policy based on conjecture. 
 
Finally, we strongly object to the implication that DAFs only have value when they make 
grants to “actual charities.” In their prior and forthcoming work, Madoff and Colinvaux 
have both conceded that community foundations are, in fact, real charities providing 
charitable services. For example, in a forthcoming paper in the Brigham Young University 
Law Review3, Colinvaux explores this very topic in detail. Why ignore that in their letter to 
the Committee?  
 
This fact is why we find it so concerning when Madoff/Colinvaux write that DAFs 
only provide public value when “funds come out of the DAF sponsor and make 
their way to active charities.” A community foundation is a 501(c)(3) public charity that 
provides programs and services for the residents in their communities. Madoff and 
Colinvaux will both concede this point, and even argue that community foundations are 
effective stewards of philanthropic dollars – yet their public criticisms rarely make this 
distinction for policymakers. We consider this exclusion a grave disservice. 
 
In the paper cited above, Colinvaux also writes, “a spend-down rule, similar to that which 
applies to medical and agricultural research organizations, is appropriate for national 
sponsoring organizations, in large part because of the nature of the NSO’s exemption as a 
fundraising organization…[H]owever, community foundations have a different purpose 
and serve a different constituency.” If he feels it is important to note this distinction, then 
his argument should remain consistent across audiences. 
 
We want to be clear that the community foundations field is not advocating for a 
special exemption, rule, or definition. We simply want Congress to understand that 
community foundations are real charities providing real services in every Congressional 
district, and public policy should reflect this reality. We dispute the implication by DAF 
critics that we are simply a pass-through or a conduit providing no added value to its 
donors or the community until grants are paid. 
 
Now, we would like to turn to some of the consequences if the Madoff/Colinvaux proposal 





                                                     
3 Colinvaux, Roger. (2017). Defending Place-Based Philanthropy by Defining the Community Foundation. 
Brigham Young University Law Review (forthcoming). Retrieved from 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941174.  
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Unintended Consequences of a Timed Payout 
 
(1) Reduced Charitable Giving. A required payout may increase DAF grantmaking over 
the first few years as existing DAFs must spend down. But what will happen over the long 
term? If Congress’s goal is to increase the money “going out the door,” the proposal for a 
forced 10-year payout will not have the desired effect. 
 
Many community foundations have annual DAF payout rates that are several times greater 
than the required 5 percent rate for private foundations. According to the National 
Philanthropic Trust, the average payout rate for the 608 community foundations surveyed 
for its 2016 Donor-Advised Fund report was 15.4 percent.4  So even absent a required payout, 
the average payout for community foundation DAFs is still high. 
 
The Madoff/Colinvaux proposal, however, would be to make a DAF very unattractive for 
donors looking to make a long-term commitment to a community. How can a 
community—particularly a small town, rural area, or other locality without a great 
deal of private philanthropy—build an endowment to sustain support for 
community needs if all DAF dollars must be spent within 10 years? 
 
Madoff/Colinvaux would argue that the donor should simply name the community 
foundation as the ultimate recipient of the funds, taking the family out of the equation. 
But for many of our donors, the notion of establishing a DAF is attractive precisely because 
it provides a way to engage their children and grandchildren in a lifetime of giving. If the 
DAF must be spent down within a specific time period, the ability to instill philanthropic 
values with younger generations to outlive the original donor is diminished. While 
Madoff/Colinvaux may argue that they are seeking only to curb what they perceive as 
excesses, the real-world impact of a timed payout would be to make DAFs so 
restrictive that it would virtually eliminate them as a tool for building family 
philanthropy. 
 
A forced 10-year distribution of all DAF contributions also makes it harder for the 
philanthropically-inclined entrepreneur to make significant gifts at a point of liquidity 
(when the ability to give is high but the donor has not yet developed a philanthropic 
plan). If DAFs become too restrictive relative to other vehicles, community foundations 
could “lose the moment” when a potential donor will make his or her greatest gift. A 
timed payout would make it far less likely that these one-time liquidity events will result 
in large charitable gifts to meet critical community needs.Ultimately, these donors will 
turn to alternate methods of “moment-in-time” giving, as opposed to creating a vehicle 
allowing consistent and sustained giving over a period of time. 
 
 
                                                     
4 https://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/index.html.  
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(2) Bias in Favor of “Big” Philanthropy. A required timed payout proposal for DAFs 
communicates to the public that the concept of “endowment” (building a permanent 
resource that is there both now and in the future) is reserved only for large, wealthy 
institutions. 
 
Community foundations across the country work with families that want to sustain 
charitable giving into the future and/or involve their children in philanthropy—a goal for 
which DAFs are both a feasible and accessible option. The vast majority of these families 
have above-average assets, but are not necessarily “rich.” The average size of a DAF at a 
community foundation was $451,000 in 2015.5 Most financial advisors would recommend 
against establishing a family foundation unless the donor family has about ten times that 
amount (or more) to give. 
 
What the 10-year payout proposal for DAFs says to these families is this: If you don’t have 
the wealth (or ability) to start and manage a private foundation, so you want to create a 
DAF instead, you must: 
 
1. Spend down all gifts within 10 years, with no possibility to let the funds grow;  
2. Forfeit any opportunity to sustain support of effective organizations over the long run; 
and  
3. Lose the ability to engage your children in a lifetime of giving. 
 
This philosophy is counterproductive. We should be promoting all types of philanthropy. 
We believe the idea of building a permanent fund that can help the community both now 
and in the future, allowing these charitable funds to grow over time, and have giving be 
“advised” by the family is smart public policy—not an abusive tax practice, as 
Madoff/Colinvaux would have the Committee believe. 
 
Community foundations were chartered with the specific intent to build access to long-
term philanthropic resources in the communities they serve, so a pool of assets is available 
during hard times. During the Great Recession, many community foundations sustained 
and even increased their levels of grantmaking for urgent needs when individual giving 
plummeted. Yet the Madoff/Colinvaux proposal creates an environment where the only 
way community foundations can build an endowment is through unrestricted giving. We 
could provide the Finance Committee with hundreds of examples of major 
accomplishments in communities across the country that simply would not have been 
achieved had all donor-advisors had to spend down each gift over a 10-year period. 
 
In short, the flexibility DAFs provide leads to greater charitable giving over time as donors 
become more engaged and see the results of their grantmaking. This objective is one we 
all share. 
                                                     
5 National Philanthropic Trust 2013 Report, Figure 13: http://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/sponsor-type-
comparison.html#figure13.  




(3) Solution in Search of a Problem. The Madoff/Colinvaux proposal implies that 
inactivity of donor-advised funds is a pervasive problem that requires attention. However, 
the vast majority of DAF are making grants regularly with deep engagement and input 
from the designated advisors. 
 
Madoff/Colinvaux and other DAF critics posit that since it might be technically legal for 
DAF advisors to get an up-front tax deduction and then make no grants, this must be a 
significant problem that needs fixing. But the fact that something is technically legal or 
that it could occur does not mean it does occur. 
 
Overall, when you consider the full spectrum of DAFs at community foundations, only a 
small percentage of DAF accounts would be considered “inactive”—and most community 
foundations have specific policies or procedures in place to ensure that DAFs remain 
“active” according to a predetermined set of criteria. As a requirement of the National 
Standards for U.S. Community Foundations® program—which is an accreditation program 
established by and for community foundations that requires compliances with best 
practices above and beyond what is required by law—donors must acknowledge and agree 
to adhere to a policy that outlines “fund activity.” If for any reason a fund becomes 
“inactive” within the context of the agreement, the foundation maintains a predetermined 
policy whereby it will take steps to make grants from that fund.  
 
Given that (1) relatively few donor-advised funds are truly inactive, (2) the average 
payout rate is higher than the rate for private foundations, and (3) community 
foundations have demonstrated a capability to self-regulate via the National 
Standards for U.S. Community Foundations® process, we do not see the merit of 
enacting a DAF payout requirement given the risks and complexity it would entail. 
If the perceived abuse is that donors can make tax deductible gifts to a DAF but then not 
make grants, and that high average payouts can obscure significant inactivity, it seems to 
us that the heart of Madoff/Colinvaux’s concerns would be better addressed with data 
about how “active” DAFs really are—efforts for which are already underway, as evidenced 
by several provisions included in the CHARITY Act (S. 1343, H.R. 2916). 
 
(4) Problems for Endowed DAFs. The Madoff/Colinvaux proposal fails to recognize the 
important difference between endowed and non-endowed DAFs, and that the forced 
spend-down on endowed DAFs would require community foundations to spend a 
significant amount of their charitable resources to go to court to undo thousands of legal 
arrangements—which could also potentially put some foundations in violation of state law 
and a donor’s intent.  
 
With an endowed DAF, a donor advisor makes a gift to the foundation’s permanent 
endowment, and will either designate a portion of the fund as distributable or leave the 
annual distribution amount to be determined by a foundation’s internal spending policy. 
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The donor can then “advise” grants out of this annual spending amount. The principal 
remains a part of the permanent funds, and donors generally may not grant more than 
their grantmaking budget for the year. Essentially, endowed DAFs operate like small 
private foundations, with no separate legal entity. 
 
The proposed 10-year payout is thus of great concern because it would force a community 
foundation to violate or unwind the “contract” it has with the donor. Requiring these 
funds to be disbursed within a fixed number of years would potentially invite years of 
litigation, and could put some community foundations in violation of the Uniform 
Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA). 
 
(5) Unprecedented Complexity and Unanswered Questions. Madoff/Colinvaux 
present their payout proposal as if it would be a very simple proposition to implement: 
Give a donor 10 years to grant out their contributions, after which time any remainder is 
distributed to a pre-selected charity. But the proposal would be a nightmare for DAF 
sponsors, including community foundations. Consider: 
 
• Many community foundations manage hundreds, if not thousands, of accounts—and 
many of their donors are contributing to their DAFs multiple times during the year. 
How are they supposed to manage that unprecedented level of complexity, where a 
new 10-year clock starts every time a donor contributes? Or are all gifts made during a 
calendar year given the same timetable (i.e., the clock starts on January 1 following the 
calendar year of the gift)? Proponents of a timed payout have failed to address these 
central questions. 
 
• What about appreciation on the initial contributions? Does the forced payout apply to 
investment earnings, or just the amounts that a donor has contributed, since he or she 
received a charitable deduction for them? 
 
These are not questions that can be easily set aside with a wink and a nod. They require 
serious thought from policymakers, and we don’t believe the advocates for timed payouts 
on DAFs have adequately thought them through. 
 
Private Foundation Grants to Donor-Advised Funds 
 
Madoff/Colinvaux also recommend that Congress should ban the ability of private 
foundations to make grants to DAFs and have them count as “qualifying distributions.”6 
This practice has also received some attention from the Treasury Department, which 
asked for public comments on the matter. Both the Council on Foundations and the 
                                                     
6 Madoff/Colinvaux suggest precedent for such a ban by noting that the private foundation payout rule cannot 
be “evaded” by a distribution from one private foundation to another. This statement is inaccurate as the Code 
provides at least one instance where a private foundation can make a distribution to another private, non-
operating foundation, and such distribution may count toward the annual payout requirement. §4942(g)(3) 
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Community Foundation Public Awareness Initiative have submitted comments to 
Treasury on this issue. 
 
The private foundation-to-DAF issue raises similar questions as the forced payout. 
Madoff/Colinvaux assume that because it is legal for a private foundation to make grants 
to a DAF, this is normal practice and a per se abuse that should be always curtailed. 
  
CEOs from community foundations across the country will attest, however, that this 
practice often furthers a genuine charitable objective and leads to a more efficient 
and effective use of the charitable resources than would otherwise have been 
possible. For example, private foundations may use DAFs to: 
 
• Provide better stability to grantees during periods of major market fluctuations; 
• Conduct local philanthropy in close partnership with community and place-based 
foundations, directing local giving through donor-advised funds; and/or 
• Temporarily suspend grantmaking during a period of strategic planning or major 
transition, and utilize DAFs to meet their minimum distributions during these times, 
followed by very active grantmaking after the transition period.  
 
These situations further a charitable purpose and would be curtailed by Congressional 
action that goes too far in restricting the practice. Here are a few examples from leading 
community foundations explaining how a private foundation might use a DAF at the local 
community foundation to pursue a genuine charitable objective. 
 
>> EXAMPLE ONE: Helping a Nonprofit Through a Challenging Period or 
Leadership Change 
 
From Alicia Philipp, President and CEO, Community Foundation for Greater Atlanta 
 
In 2008, the Robert W. Woodruff Foundation in Atlanta wanted to grant $200 million to 
Grady Memorial Hospital. At the time, Grady was going through massive financial 
challenges and leadership upheaval, and Atlanta was on the verge of losing its only public 
hospital. Due to the leadership challenges at the hospital, it made little sense for Woodruff 
to give the hospital control of the entire $200 million in the first year. There needed to be a 
solution, and the Community Foundation served as the right steward at the right time. 
 
Woodruff originally planned to establish a DAF at the Community Foundation and 
distribute $50 million per year for four years to fund Grady's capital needs – which had 
been seriously underfunded for years – as the hospital incurred the expenses. However, it 
took much longer for Grady to become stable, and there was an additional leadership 
change at the hospital midway through. The Foundation continued to make payments 
regularly, and eight years later, the bulk has been granted out. In the end, the community 
and the grantee were both better served by having such an arrangement. 
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In this case, no one could possibly argue the Woodruff Foundation was using the DAF to 
skirt its payout requirements. By having the flexibility to use the DAF, and by relying on 
the management expertise of the Community Foundation, the Woodruff Foundation made 
its gift more meaningful and efficient than had it granted $200 million directly to the 
hospital when the management structure was not in place to effectively use the funds. 
 
>> EXAMPLE TWO: Maintaining a Private Foundation’s Giving Through Financial 
Upheaval 
 
From Max Williams, President and CEO, Oregon Community Foundation  
 
In 2008, when the financial market experienced significant losses, a family foundation in 
Oregon whose mission is to serve rural communities saw their asset base plunge. Many of 
Oregon’s rural communities also suffered extreme losses during this market downturn, 
and the nonprofits serving these communities saw a tremendous uptick in the number of 
people requesting services. The foundation’s loss in assets was so significant that it was 
challenged to meet many of its multi-year grant commitments, which were set as fixed 
dollar amounts and were put at risk when the payout requirement applied to a much 
smaller asset pool. 
 
To solve this problem, the private foundation turned to a DAF it maintained at the Oregon 
Community Foundation to augment its 5 percent payout requirement and keep its grant 
commitments. The DAF was more than halved in value during this period. As the market 
rebounded, the family foundation rebuilt the DAF’s assets with a percentage of their 
foundation’s payout to create a resource to support rural communities if another market 
downturn occurs. The DAF’s grantmaking supports rural nonprofit organizations that fit 
the criteria of the family foundation and an average of $1.2 million is paid out from the 
fund each year.  
 
Allowing the private foundation to make these gifts has resulted in a clear win-win for the 
community. If this practice was banned or restricted, it would be much harder for 
foundations to make the multi-year – and often unrestricted – grants that nonprofit 
organizations so desperately need. The ability of the private foundation to make grants to 
the DAF makes private philanthropy more willing to make long-term commitments. 
 
>> EXAMPLE THREE: Helping a Family Maintain a Commitment to Their Former 
Community 
 
From Tim Beaton, Executive Director, Fargo-Moorhead Area Foundation (Fargo, ND) 
 
The Fargo-Moorhead Area Foundation is working with a potential donor who made 
his/her fortune in the Fargo area, but has not lived in the community for several years. As 
a result, the donor is no longer familiar with the community’s most successful nonprofit 
organizations. To remedy this, the community foundation is developing an arrangement 
by which the donor’s private foundation would make an annual distribution to a DAF at 
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the community foundation and the community foundation will provide regular 
grantmaking assistance to the donor to ensure that its grants are going to effective 
nonprofits in the Fargo community. 
 
All or most of each year’s distribution are expected to be granted within 12 months. As a 
result, this arrangement will help local nonprofits almost immediately. The donor plans to 
work with the community foundation to develop a “community needs list,” which will be 
reviewed at least annually. Based on that list, the community foundation would then vet 
nonprofit organizations and projects that would address those needs. This arrangement 
would be contractual– the community foundation would have to do this each year. 
 
While it would be possible for the donor to make grants directly from the private 
foundation to the local organizations in our community, by creating a DAF, the donor can 
work with the professional (and local) staff of the community foundation to ensure that its 
resources are achieving the greatest possible impact. Here, the PF’s annual grant to a DAF, 
which represents a portion of its required payout, will do the community enormous good. 
The resulting philanthropy will be more targeted and efficient. 
 
These are just three examples showing how DAFs at community foundations are 
very effective grantmaking tools for private foundations.  We have also heard from 
community foundations that have donors who use the DAF as a way to simplify and 
expand their private foundation’s grantmaking.  For example, some donors give more 
money to more organizations because they can make one large grant to the DAF from 
their private foundation, then the DAF distributes the funds.  This makes it easier for a 
small foundation without permanent staff to support many charities.  Another common 
example is the family that may not have been doing robust grantmaking via their 
foundations because family members couldn’t agree on grantees, so the money would 
sit.  However, these families discovered that splitting the corpus and/or a percentage of 
the foundation evenly into individual DAFs allowed them spend the grant money 
immediately to more organizations, thus truly “spreading the wealth.”  
 
We understand Madoff/Colinvaux’s concern that—in some cases—a family foundation 
might use a DAF as a means to skirt payout requirements, and clearly we would frown 
on such activity. But in our experience, private foundations use DAFs at community 
foundations because they want to further a charitable objective—not because they 
want to somehow “shelter” the funds and keep the money in their control.  The 




In conclusion, after studying Madoff/Colinvaux’s critiques—and those of other DAF 
critics—it seems to us that the central underlying policy concern driving both the 
payout proposal and the private foundation-to-DAF restriction is the concern that the 
DAF isn’t active or making regular grants into the community. Critics fear the money 
will sit, and that a taxpayer who has benefited from a charitable contribution will 
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somehow keep the funds sheltered away from public needs. They concede that the 
average DAF payout is several times that of private foundations, but that somehow 
this average high payout shields significant inactivity. 
 
But these critics are suggesting a new set of restrictive rules based on 
conjecture, without first asking for more sunlight and data to inform 
Congressional action. If average DAF payouts are three times the private foundation 
payout rate, and the vast majority of DAF accounts are making grants regularly and/or 
the DAF advisers have plans in place for future activity, there doesn’t seem to be a 
public policy problem requiring urgent action. For these reasons, we urge the 
Committee to set aside the extreme proposals advanced by DAF critics and instead 
acknowledge the self-policing work of the sector by continuing to work with us and 
other practitioners to write legislation that reflects the realities of philanthropic work, 
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